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ABSTRACT
There have been major developments in the understanding of disease and its treatment in the last 150
years. The development of the knowledge base on patterns of disease and injury in seafarers and on the
effectiveness of intervention to prevent and treat them indicates the sorts of information that were col-
lected and the settings in which it was possible to collect it. They also show how it has been used, as well
as the reactions of those in the maritime sector to the collection and analysis of health information and to
its use as a means of reducing harm.
(Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 4: 210–216)
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In the 19th century, case reports and series provided
most of the information on acute conditions, supplemen-
ted by more detailed studies of outbreaks of infection
brought ashore by seafarers in port cities. Information from
these was applied to preventative measures but, with few
effective treatments available, could do little to reduce the
outcomes of illness and injury. Long-term risk received lit-
tle attention.
The risk of pulmonary tuberculosis among seafarers was
the impetus for the first long-term incidence-based morta-
lity studies, which provided important information that ai-
ded prevention, mainly by reduction in overcrowded crew
quarters and by providing facilities for diagnosis and treat-
ment. However, detailed studies of morbidity, other than
case series, were only undertaken when there were press-
ing needs under wartime conditions.
The good archives and early development of merchant
seafaring in the UK make it a suitable location to study.
This historical review shows the use of different approa-
ches to data collection and analysis, the settings in which
it could be collected, the difficulties in defining the size and
makeup of the overall population of seafarers, and the uses
to which analyses of the information could be put. The atti-
tudes of employers, seafarers, regulators, and health pro-
fessionals to the collection and analysis of data and to its
use for prevention and treatment are noted.
INTRODUCTION: THE START OF MODERN
REGULATION
The 1867 UK Merchant Shipping Act provides a conve-
nient starting point for assessing the development of the
knowledge base underpinning maritime health provisions.
Evidence on the interactions between the state, ship ow-
ners and those concerned for the health of seafarers is
well recorded from that time [1]. Previously there had been
limited requirements for ships to carry medicines and for
doctors to be aboard certain classes of passenger, emi-
grant, convict, and whale catching ships [2]. The Royal Navy
and The East India Company had long had such arrange-
ments in place [3]. Provisions for individual seafarers who
needed medical care away from their home-port derived
from traditional maritime laws dating back to the Middle
Ages [4]. What the 1867 Act did was to specify the medi-
cines to be carried on board in more detail, including their
quality; it also made provision for, but did not require, med-
ical examinations of seafarers before embarkation; it in-
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troduced quality standards for citrus juice to prevent scur-
vy and required ships to carry a guide to medical care at
sea (The Ship Captain’s Medical Guide). It did not, as advo-
cates for improvement had hoped, cover more costly mea-
sures to improve health such as better vessel safety, diet
beyond antiscorbutics, or standards for crew accommoda-
tion [5]. Thus it created a statutory framework for several
important aspects of maritime health, but one that was
tempered by what was politically and economically accept-
able to the powerful interest groups concerned, notably the
ship-owners.
The Act’s provisions reflected prior concerns and cam-
paigns. There was a continuing debate during the nine-
teenth century about the toll from loss of life at sea, espe-
cially by shipwreck, and whether this was a result of unsea-
worthy vessels or unseaworthy seamen [6]. Many onshore
activists argued that it was the poor vessels, coupled with
the existence of an insurance market, that minimized the
financial penalties to the owner in the event that a ship
was lost. The ‘shipping interest’, in resisting this allegation,
pointed to declining standards of seamanship and in turn
blamed the poor condition of British seamen — often short-
hand for intemperance and the effects of alcohol, coupled
with dissolute behaviour and venereal disease [7]. The ship-
owners’ resistance to safety-related changes to vessels and
to what they saw as state interference in their commercial
practices continued, as seen in the further twenty years re-
sistance to introduction of load lines [8]. By contrast, suffi-
cient evidence to provoke action on seafarers’ health came
from a series of anonymous articles in the British Medical
Journal that used the admissions data from the Dreadnought
Seamen’s Hospital in Greenwich to show the pattern of ill-
ness in seamen [9]. This made a very clear case that, while
alcohol and venereal disease contributed to illness, other
aspects such as the poor quality of the citrus juice purchased
by owners and masters led to preventable illness in returned
seamen, with many suffering from scurvy, long after the Royal
Navy had all but eliminated the problems by providing good
quality juice [10].
The campaign for better health protection was led by
a voluntary self-appointed organization ‘The Society for Im-
proving the Conditions of Merchant Seamen’, which met
for several months in early 1867 and made a range of re-
commendations, a number of which were taken into the
1867 Act [11]. One of the members of the Society was Dr
Harry Leach from the Seamen’s Hospital, who emerged as
the writer of the British Medical Journal articles. He went
on to be author of the Ship Captain’s Medical Guide, also
advising the government on the format for the seafarer
medical examination and becoming the official Inspector
of Lemon Juice! [12]. Dr Leach’s published evidence took
the form of a case series from the hospital. This did not
enable either the prevalence or the incidence of diseases
to be calculated and was limited to those who were ill whilst
in the Port of London. It is not clear how much of the re-
corded illness was in fact a result of risk on shore, includ-
ing typhus in lodging houses and venereal infections from
sex in ports, rather than at sea. It was, however, sufficient
to make the case for action, as well as providing a bench-
mark against which trends, notably the decline in scurvy
with quality assured citrus juice, could be followed [13].
ACUTE ILLNESS
Most information on disease in seafarers at this time
took the form of case series. Another large one was from
the English Hospital in Callau, the main port of Peru, in
1872 and showed a similar pattern of nutritional problems
including scurvy [14]. Most ships arriving there had been
several months at sea. From 1882 the Marine Department
collected information from ships’ masters on causes of loss
of life at sea, including from illness. British Consuls also
provided information on distressed seamen in the ports
where they were stationed and on any death of a seaman.
A summary was published annually, but using a classifica-
tion of causes of death that was unique to the Marine De-
partment and which was reliant on the limited diagnostic
skills of master and consuls [15]. The annual publications
became a routine and little use was made of them as the
basis for action to improve health.
The growth in public health in ports both before and
after the 1875 UK Public Health Act provided local resourc-
es for investigating outbreaks of infectious disease, includ-
ing the role of seafarers as vectors in its introduction from
foreign ports. These investigations used techniques such
as geographical spread and trends in cases, case incidence,
prevalence, and outcome to monitor the outbreak and its
control. This was locally important — leading to preventa-
tive action — as well as being of national and international
significance [16]. It also fitted with the newly emergent sci-
ence of bacteriology in showing the importance of conta-
gious transmission [17].
Improvements to health for seamen in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century did take place. These
included statutory requirements for food supplies and for
the training of ship’s cooks. There were some limited im-
provements in accommodation, while training for officers
in first aid and medical care was introduced [18]. In the
meantime the requirements for medicines and medical
equipment to be carried and the Ship Captain’s Medical
Guide were regularly updated [19]. Empirical observations
and changes to onshore practice rather than evidence on
patterns of disease at sea were the drivers for such change.
One illustrative example was the decision to require ships
to carry a clinical thermometer. Yellow fever was a com-
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mon cause of death in seafarers and a common clinical
view was that deaths from yellow fever could be reduced
by resting at an early stage in the disease [20]. An objec-
tive measure of infection was a rise in temperature, but
without confirmation by thermometer a seaman claiming
to be feverish could just be shirking duties. However, intro-
duction was slow because of the concern of officials about
the cost to ship-owners and the lack of training in its use by
officers; the latter being countered by comparing the sim-
plicity of reading a thermometer to taking sun sights using
a sextant!
CHRONIC DISEASE MORTALITY
Information on illness and injury at sea and immedi-
ately after arrival in port could be used to provide definitive
information on maritime accident risks and a view of the
frequency of acute diseases. It could not provide any indi-
cation of chronic disease risks associated with seafaring.
It was possible to count cases, within the limits of the avail-
able diagnostic skills, at sea. It was, and remains, more
difficult to collect similar information on diseases in sea-
farers arising while in port, on leave, between periods of
sea service, or after retirement, while linking them to par-
ticular types of work aboard is almost impossible. Adding
up the cases identified in these different settings to obtain
an overview of the pattern of chronic disease in seafarers
posed a problem because of differences in diagnosis and
recording. Information on the relative frequency of differ-
ent conditions, of the sort derived from case series, only
allowed limited comparisons, for instance between differ-
ent groups of seafarers or between seafarers and the rest
of the working population. Long-term risk could easily be
missed or ignored.
Information on the number of people at risk was nee-
ded to make more valid comparisons. This has always been
a particularly complex statistic to collect because of the
pattern of work and leave in seafarers. For many seafarers
employment has been casual and so the duration of per-
iods of sea service and time on land are not consistent. No
registers of seafarers or social security data were available
a century ago. This meant that it was not possible to mea-
sure the two main indicators of disease that had already
been adopted for public health purposes and by the armed
forces: prevalence, that is the percentage of a population
that has a disease at any one time, and incidence, that is
the number of new cases of a disease that arise in a popu-
lation of a given size over a given time period [21].
Improving the quality of information on disease has
costs. Both the cost of an investigation and the potential
cost if the investigation shows that action is needed can
be seen as a threat by some and an opportunity by oth-
ers. It was concern about the frequency of pulmonary tu-
berculosis (PTB) in merchant seamen that brought this to
a point where the overall population of seafarers was first
estimated to enable prevalence and incidence rates to
be derived [22]. Much of the impetus for this was a result
of the endeavours of Fleet Surgeon Home. He was a na-
val surgeon who was used to the good incidence data that
was available on naval personnel and knew its importance
in monitoring PTB risks and reducing them [23]. In the
1920s he wrote a series of articles in which he used the
limited information on the numbers and deaths of mer-
chant seamen to attempt to quantify PTB incidence [24].
In doing so he pointed out the deficiencies of the avail-
able information, eventually persuading the Marine De-
partment to align their coding of information on deaths
at sea with that used in public health, thus enabling com-
parisons to be made. He also showed how the at-risk pop-
ulation could be derived from available statistics, and iden-
tified the ways in which these could be improved to en-
able denominators for incidence and prevalence rates to
be calculated. He showed that, while PTB was not a cause
of excess mortality at sea, deaths were far in excess of
the rates for the rest of the population for seafarers in
the first year after they ceased to work at sea [25]. Most,
he surmised, would have had to stop work because of
symptoms and then died soon afterwards. They would very
likely have been a source of infection to their shipmates
for a while before ceasing to work.
Home’s work had a number of consequences: the Ma-
rine Department finally acknowledged the need for a for-
mal mortality study on merchant seamen, and this was
commissioned and published in 1932 — largely confirming
Home’s findings but in a more rigorous way [26]. Accom-
modation standards for seamen on merchant ships were
improved, at some cost to ship-owners. X-ray screening for
seafarers was initiated, and a number of special sanatoria
for treatment of seafarers who fell outside the normal on-
shore arrangements for treatment were opened [27]. Peri-
odic mortality studies of UK seafarers have been a con-
tinuing source of information since then [28]. These have
continued to use methods similar to those used in the 1932
study. They have shown a decline in infectious diseases,
including PTB and an increase in heart disease to become
the major killing disease in seafarers. Fatal accident infor-
mation is also investigated, showing a declining trend, but
with rates that are still well in excess of those in high-risk
sectors of onshore employment. In fishing they are even
higher and have not shown the same reducing incidence.
TREATMENT AND FITNESS
Mortality is the most extreme measure of disease, but
one where recording of the event is almost invariable. There
was less progress on the collection and analysis of non-
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-fatal disease information, except on the minority of ships
that carried a surgeon, and even here the owners were of-
ten unenthusiastic about the release of information that
could be against their commercial interests [29]. As under-
standing of disease improved from the 1860s and as more
effective treatments were introduced in the twentieth cen-
tury, disease statistics ashore became both more useful
and of greater practical importance, not only for identifying
preventative needs but also for assessing the effectiveness
of treatment. Chemotherapy for syphilis, introduced from
around 1910, was one of the drivers for such data collec-
tion in seafarers [30]. The treatment needed to be contin-
ued over several months and given in a clinic. Systems of
cards carried between port clinics were established, and
Norway, with a rapidly growing merchant fleet, took an in-
ternational lead in proposing a worldwide network of clin-
ics not just for this purpose but also to meet the other health
care needs of seafarers, who were poorly looked after by
existing arrangements [31]. However, these collaborative
efforts yielded little in the way of published health data
except on venereal diseases. In the early years of radio-
medical advice to ships records of contacts were not anal-
ysed and used as a source of information on patterns of
illness at sea.
It took the need for fit seafarers to crew merchant ships
in the Second World War to secure detailed investigations
of health and disease, although sadly wartime constraints
meant that most of the results went unpublished and are
only to be found in state archives. Malaria was taking its
toll on crews on vessels assembling in West Africa to form
convoys northwards. Studies were done to identify the ports
and anchorages with the highest risk [32]. A ‘malaria in-
dex’ was developed, using case incidence per day in port
as a measure. As a consequence targeted onshore mos-
quito eradication programmes and recommendations about
the use of antimalarials were developed — to good effect.
Venereal disease was a major contributor to crew disabili-
ty, and agreed treatment regimes that applied to all allied
seamen were introduced together with intensive education-
al initiatives and supplies of condoms [33]. The evidence
of risk for this became available because there was a ‘pool’
of allied seamen who were medically assessed and the
numbers unfit to embark were recorded. Other evidence
on morbidity still came from seafarers coming ashore from
vessels and from continuing statistical recording of some
diseases such as PTB and syphilis [34].
As noted, the concept of ‘fitness’ and the ‘able bodied
seaman’ underlay thinking on maritime medical matters
from the 1860s. This was an area of controversy, not least
as seamen’s unions developed and were concerned about
the coercive nature of medical selection and the denial of
employment to some of their members [35]. The failure of
employers and masters to use the state-provided system
of fitness assessment created in 1867 resulted in most of
the assessment that was done being entirely on the em-
ployer’s terms and often with little or no redress for an ag-
grieved seaman [36]. Right back to the original medical
examination recommendations for the 1867 Merchant
Shipping Act much of the selection was based on diseases
that were known from experience to adversely affect work
at sea, to be a danger to others aboard, or to be liable to
get worse and mean that an ill seaman had to be cared for
aboard, with all the limitations on treatment that this im-
plied. Landing a seafarer for treatment at a foreign port
was a cost to the employer or, failing that, the state.
Eyesight was one area where decisions on fitness were
underpinned by some evidence. Red and green navigation
lights came into general use by the 1880s, and colour vi-
sion defects were found to be contributing to night-time
collisions [37]. Tests performed by the Marine Department
were introduced for officers. The fairness of these tests was
contested between the emerging officers’ unions and the
state. Cases where anomalies in test results were found
led to experimental field studies of night colour vision in
1911 prior to the introduction of testing lanterns that sim-
ulated navigation lights [38].
Since the 1940s there have been a number of studies
on particular aspects of seafarer health in the UK and the
mortality study referred to above continues to provide in-
formation on causes of death. However, the globalization
of both the maritime labour market and the registration of
ships means that single country studies are likely to be-
come less and less relevant to risk comparisons.
DISCUSSION
Evidence on the health of seafarers has been and con-
tinues to be used for a variety of purposes. It can inform
about and make the case for legislative action, it can help
define policies and practices about who can safely work at
sea, it may identify risks arising from living and working at
sea, and it can help develop better arrangements for ma-
naging illness and injury in seafarers. Three factors can be
seen to govern the improvement of the knowledge base
and are apparent in this historical review; their relevance
to the present will be considered in subsequent articles.
They are, first, the motivation to collect data on the health
of seafarers; second how the data, once collected, may be
used; and underpinning both of these lie the available
methods for the analysis of such information.
Most of the early data-sets were put together by doc-
tors, who had seafarers as patients, and they are often
based on their own clinical records. Each set of data pro-
vided a view on the distribution of different types of illness
as diagnosed at the location where the doctor was work-
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ing. This distribution could be compared with the distribu-
tion at other locations or in non-seafaring populations, but
the overall frequency of any form of illness could not be
determined. These data sets could usually be compiled at
low cost. They were published and sometimes then used,
as in the case of Leach’s series on scurvy and other dis-
eases seen at the Seaman’s Hospital, to make the case for
action to improve prevention or treatment.
More informally, the opinion of those with expertise in
the diseases of seamen often formed the basis for action.
This was not usually codified but played a large part in re-
solving particular issues such as the need for clinical ther-
mometers aboard and for many other changes to medical
stores, and to the advice given in the Ship Captain’s Medi-
cal Guide. The motivation of those providing and interpret-
ing this evidence was similar to that of those who collected
case series: to improve protection while enhancing their
positions and reputations as experts in maritime health.
This was a low-cost approach to improving protection for
seafarers but one that could readily become biased by the
observations and opportunism of a few practitioners. As
such it could be readily challenged by both practitioners
with differing views and by those who felt threatened by
the consequences of decision taking that was based on
such information, whether that be employers who objected
to additional costs, unions who saw threats to the employ-
ment of their members, or state institutions who had their
policies and approaches challenged.
Probably the first moves towards systematic investiga-
tion of health aspects of seafaring came from onshore pub-
lic health authorities who were concerned about the spread
of infectious disease brought in through port cities. One of
the key features here was the commitment of resources of
people and money to the investigation of outbreaks and to
preventative measures to avoid introduction of diseases or
to limit their spread.
Studies of mortality or morbidity in seafarers based on
population estimates enabled better comparisons to be
made but had to be based on incidence or prevalence rates.
These needed funding and a project structure to ensure
that valid results were collected and then analysed in
a suitable way that would allow sound and unequivocal con-
clusions to be drawn whenever it was possible to do so. The
germ of this approach can be seen in the campaigning and
studies of Home on mortality from PTB and other diseases.
He did this, it seems, as a matter of personal commitment.
In doing so he made a case that meant that the state had to
fund a larger study on seafarers’ mortality and, having fund-
ed it, consider the implications of its results in detail and
support a series of actions, some quite costly, to mitigate
the harm from PTB in seafarers. The more recent mortality
studies on the health of UK seafarers, which have been fund-
ed by the state, similarly provide a source of evidence for the
development of policies and practices that regulators can
find hard to ignore.
Most evidence on the effectiveness of interventions has
come from time trends, whether in case reports or in popu-
lation based incidence or prevalence studies. Early success
with scurvy was followed by reducing trends in acute infec-
tions and later in PTB. Shorter-term measures of effective-
ness come from specific studies such as those on malaria
risks and prevention or on venereal disease treatment. It
seems from accident reports that colour vision testing pre-
vented incidents attributable to confusion over lights but,
until test methods were improved, at the price of unneces-
sarily excluding a number of officers from work.
Good quality morbidity studies on disease in seafarers
are rare. The only examples that are apparent are those
done during the Second World War on malaria and venere-
al disease treatment. As they were done in wartime condi-
tions to help reduce pressing manpower shortages their
significance, both as a model for future work and as publi-
cally available sources of evidence, was limited. They were,
however, an effective means of prioritizing actions and re-
ducing harm, as shown by the prevalence of illness in sea-
farers at the time.
Two other types of investigation played a part in deter-
mining some fitness standards, such as those for colour
vision. A case series of incidents, maritime accidents, and
near misses that could be attributed to colour impairment
was collected to make the case for improvements in test
methods. Later when the improved test methods were found
to be flawed a series of practical experiments was under-
taken to determine the essential colour vision capabilities
for lookouts in order to inform about the development of
better test methods.
The investigations considered in this article have been ini-
tiated either by individuals with a professional interest in ma-
ritime health or by the state. Thus there are a number of im-
portant gaps in contributors to the knowledge base. Employ-
ers have rarely collected and even more rarely published infor-
mation on health among the crews they employed. Perhaps
this is because they implicitly recognised that identification of
any new problem is likely to rebound on them: hence in their
view ‘no news is good news’. Similarly trade unions, while pro-
testing both about the risks to their members and the adverse
consequences for employment of medical selection proce-
dures, have done little to produce evidence of harm or loss of
opportunity beyond individual case reports. Insurers, despite
handling some of the higher-cost medical claims, usually re-
garded their claims data as commercially confidential and so
did not add to the pool of knowledge.
Other underused sources of information become ap-
parent when the historical developments are assessed.
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These include the results of medical fitness examinations
of seafarers, only analysed in wartime and very recently.
Examination results provide a useful but incomplete pic-
ture, as those who have serious illness are unlikely to come
for an examination that is for a job that they know they will
not be able to perform. Records of illness at sea could, in
principle, have been gleaned from ships logs and medical
records as well as from the use they make of medical equi-
pment aboard and of radiomedical advice. Illness in those
needing treatment in port should be accessible either by
cross referencing from ships’ logs or by collecting it from
those doctors who play a major part in arranging referrals.
Port studies provided an important source of information
in the nineteenth century that is no longer exploited. Re-
tired seafarers would be widely dispersed, but follow up
would have been possible through the records of a small
number of pension funds.
Seafarers are only one occupational group, but a distin-
ctive one. For many conditions their pattern of illness has
been similar to the rest of the population. For this reason
information about other parts of the population can often
form the basis for estimating risks to seafarers’ health and
deciding on the priorities for intervention. In particular the
treatment of seafarers who become ill will usually be the
same as any other member of the population although it
may have to take place in different surroundings. Knowledge
from other groups has often been used informally to reach
decisions relevant to seafarers, with yellow fever providing
a series of examples: the measurement of the temperature to
identify those with yellow fever at an early stage then, once
the mosquito vector was discovered, to introduce precautions
to reduce bites. This was followed, once the virus had been
identified, by the development and adoption of immunization.
Information on seafarer’s health has been used to ini-
tiate a range of interventions, such as training, equipment,
and support for medical emergencies at sea and determin-
ing what are fair and rational medical fitness standards for
work at sea and for the prevention of occupational and life-
style risks to health in seafarers. All these have long histori-
cal roots but remain present day areas of concern. In nearly
all cases most decisions on what is needed have been tak-
en on a very limited evidence base. The best form of evi-
dence is often that which enables a well-defined operational
question to be answered rather than that which provides
a broad comparison of the health of seafarers and of other
groups. The present day knowledge base will be the subject
of the following articles.
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